We provide an evolutionary model of conflict based on dyadic interactions within and between individuals drawn from a society containing fundamentalists and "others." Thus, the paper presents an asymmetric game representation of group effects. Fundamentalist control of society is inversely related to the degree of social stratification, and fundamentalists' intolerance of others.
Introduction
During the Cold War, political and economic ideologies polarized the world; in the post-Cold War era, religious and cultural beliefs are the dominant drivers of conflict. Conflict between ethnic and religious groups, which hold diverse social values, has made intra-state wars the most prevalent form of large-scale conflict during the last decade (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Murdoch and Sandler 2004) . Even the rise in the lethality of transnational terrorism has been attributed to the increase in fundamentalist-based groups that have supplanted left-wing groups as the more common terrorist motivation (Hoffman 1998 , Enders and Sandler 1999 , 2000 . Fundamentalism is not sufficient for conflict; rather, conflict stems from how fundamentalists identify themselves and how society responds to their demands.
Intra-state conflict can be rooted in contests over resources, political identity, grievances, and political agenda that culminate into the issue of social control. In day-to-day human interactions, social control figures prominently in conflicts, where opposing interests cannot consummate an agreement. In recent years, rent-seeking models, where opponents allocate efforts to vie over a prize, have provided one foundation for the study of conflict (Dixit 1987 , Hirshleifer 2001 . Another foundation derives from a general-equilibrium approach, where a government must fend off threats from an aggrieved subpopulation, whose resources are being appropriated by the ruling interests (Grossman 1991) . A third foundation is derived from the study of collective action, in which participation in a revolt is based on personal and collective gains along with the risks of capture (Sandler 1992, pp. 182-188) . A fourth foundation is provided by evolutionary game theory, for which opposing interests' traits or values can lead to conflict and influence the population dynamics that determine a society's character (Hirshleifer 1998 , Skyrms 1996 .
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic model of fundamentalism and conflict with microfoundations based on dyadic interactions over social control. We extend Skyrms' (1996) evolutionary model of distributive justice to investigate how fundamentalism can evolve within a society. Two alternative models of fundamentalists' efforts to achieve social control are contrasted. The first is based on social cohesion among fundamentalists, who are intolerant of the "other" subpopulation, while the second is based on counterfeit behavior exhibited by nonfundamentalists, who are trying to "fit in" and get better terms of social exchange from fundamentalists. This second model extends earlier work on counterfeit behavior (Arce and Sandler 2003) to permit within-group encounters -assortative interaction.
A contribution of this study is that group effects, which have been previously identified only for symmetric games (Bergstrom 2002 (Bergstrom , 2003 , are addressed in an asymmetric game.
Asymmetries and group effects are essential to understanding intra-state conflict. In our investigation, asymmetries reflect the perspective of fundamentalists and the rest of the population that is characteristic of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamic rule in Iran, the 2005 riots in France, and Sunni governance in Iraq (prior to the downfall of Saddam Hussein). Group effects capture not only the interaction between groups, but also the relative isolationism associated with groups.
A dynamic perspective provides an environment where costly short-run commitments to a fundamentalist agenda can result in long-run payoffs owing to changes in the other group's bestresponse strategy. Our dynamics occur at the individual level within finitely lived groups that represent spheres of societal interactions.
Our analysis facilitates a true sociopolitical representation of conflict where social groups matter. In the absence of counterfeitability, fundamentalist dominance is inversely related to the extent that fundamentalists are ostracized, and their intolerance of others. This intolerance increases as the terms of trade that fundamentalists demand from others in social exchanges are more one-sided. When counterfeit behavior is allowed and there is sufficient between-group (nonassortative) interaction, fundamentalist intolerance augments counterfeitability, inducing much of the society to display fundamentalist traits as in Nazi-ruled Germany, Ceausescu's Romania, or Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. We also establish that a fair and open society decreases the effectiveness of counterfeitable fundamentalism. This has an important message for the way that a liberal democracy should counter fundamentalist challenges. Although terrorist experts (see, e.g., Wilkinson 2001) have called for fairness and openness despite catastrophic terrorist events, no theoretical foundation for such behavior has been previously formulated.
Models of social control
Our characterization of fundamentalists is in terms of the control that they desire to exercise in a social interaction with nonfundamentalists. For fundamentalists, group differences can be based upon ethnicity, religion, culture, language, skin color, appearance, or other ascriptive traits. When group differences become "fundamental," they permeate society, dividing it along myriad issues that can lead to conflict (Horowitz 2000, Chapter 1) . These include citizenship, voting franchise, income distribution, land policy, justice, social mobility, religious freedoms, and employment opportunities. Once group differences become fundamental, the ultimate issue is one of social control. As such, we consider pairwise interactions over sharing "a unit" as a generic representation of bargaining over social control.
Our view of fundamentalists extends beyond those who demand social predominance of their religious practices. We characterize any individual who must set the social agenda by obtaining more favorable social terms of exchange at the expense of an individual of another subpopulation as a fundamentalist. Consequently, members of an academic department are fundamentalists if they must control hiring decisions, tenure outcomes, field offerings, the list of "legitimate" journals, or acceptable methodologies or theoretical paradigms. Zealotry or extremism are alternative descriptions of the type of behavior under analysis, which is indicative of intolerance to the viewpoint of others.
Our first model of social control is based on Skyrms' (1996) adaptation of the Nash (1953) demand game to create an evolutionary model of the distribution of social justice. In this approach, there are three types of demands for social control, defined over the range [0, 1]: 
, if 1; and 0, otherwise.
If the demands for social control are feasible (i.e., not greater than one), then each individual receives his or her demand and this determines his or her claim on the gains from social exchange. If demands are infeasible, conflict ensues, and no voluntary exchange is achieved.
Over time, the evolutionary fitness of each type of demand is determined by Eq. (1) and the distribution of demands within society.
Box 1 summarizes Skyrms' (1996) is fair, or some proportion of the population is moderate, and its complement is intolerant (the polymorphic equilibrium). A novel result is that conflict can take place in the polymorphic equilibrium, because (I, I) matchings occur with positive probability.
We inject the question of fundamentalism into the issue of social control by observing that fundamentalist groups are often more cohesive than the general population, and are unwilling to compromise on how their social norms define social control. Cohesiveness shows up as fundamentalists never settling for less than half of the social control in any encounter; hence, modest demands are not offered by fundamentalists. For example, the Nazis dictated grossly intolerant terms to Jews regarding education, jobs, ownership rights, and trading opportunities.
The Nazis also presented unfavorable terms of exchange to all non-Party members. Unfair social division has led to civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, Algeria, and elsewhere. Analogous unequal interactions between Catholics and Protestants were behind the "troubles" in Northern Ireland.
Fundamentalists often define outsiders through reference to the "other" (Huntington 1996, p. 129), a distinction that we maintain. The pairwise interaction between others and fundamentalists is therefore given by Box 2, denoted as the Clash of Cultures. In Box 2, the row types are others and the column types are fundamentalists. The situation is no longer symmetric as cohesive fundamentalists are able to eliminate consideration of moderate behavior in promoting their norms.
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The same cannot be said for the elimination of fair behavior among fundamentalists, insofar as fair interaction between them and others is characteristically common.
An alternative version is counterfeitable fundamentalism. 2 When fundamentalism is counterfeitable there are identifiable markers associated with the adherence to fundamentalist norms that even non-fundamentalists can exhibit. Such traits or behavioral markers may involve dress (e.g., Burqas worn by non-Taliban women), grooming, rituals, pledged allegiances, displays (e.g., public demonstrations), or observances of social norms. Goertz (1998) 
As defined, C is not a costly strategy for others to adopt; we address costly counterfeit behavior in section 5.
In order to gauge the impact of fundamentalism on the distribution of social control, we must recognize that within-group interactions may be substantially different from otherfundamentalist encounters. Clearly, one of the goals of fundamentalism is to blur this difference, so that all members of society measure their social interactions in light of fundamentalist mores.
Assessing fundamentalist strategies for accomplishing this goal is one of our objectives. We also identify characteristics that make a society impervious to fundamentalist designs on social control.
Group effects
Evolutionary models typically assume that natural selection takes place at the level of individual strategy, which is taken to be a gene or meme in evolutionary biology, preferences for altruism and reciprocity in socioeconomic models, and regime building in international political economy. Recently, models of natural selection at the group level have been successfully employed to explain observed phenomena that otherwise would not survive under the pressures of individual selection. These include the female bias in the sex ratio in many invertebrate species; and the persistence of virulent diseases that "choose" to prolong the lives of their hosts, rather than (selfishly) increasing their rate of reproduction (Sober and Wilson 1998) . Both of these are examples of altruism in the evolutionary sense -when an individual's action increases the fitness of others at the expense of his or her own fitness.
Group effects occur when matching is allowed to be assortative, so that pairwise matchings are not independent of one's type. When matching is assortative, altruistic groups can have increased fitness relative to nonaltruistic groups, even though nonaltruistic individuals within an altruistic group will have higher fitness than their altruistic counterparts within the same group.
Hence, the assessment of the source of fitness of a sociobiological system requires the separation of group from individual effects, and therefore the allowance of assortative versus nonassortative matching. Otherwise, within-group and between-group phenomena get lost in the overall averaging, much as in Simpson's (1951) paradox.
Understandably, we assume that a matching between two fundamentalists is not independent of them being fundamentalists. Some fundamentalist groups are more insular than others; thus, we must account for this when determining the ability of fundamentalists to gain social control. Additionally, some societies are highly segregated, and others more integrated, and this is likely to impact the spread of fundamentalism. As discussed in Cooper and Wallace (2004) , one can think of positive assortativity in terms of a type-dependent matching process that creates finitely enduring groups, where members subsequently interact in randomly assigned pairs. In this context, our analysis employs assortativity as an inverse measure of a society's integration (degree of fundamentalist-other interactions). At the individual level, the outcomes of these within-and between-group pairwise interactions are represented by an underlying game. 
Asymmetric games
Evolutionary games represent the outcomes of pairwise matchings from a large population. For this reason the outcomes of such matchings are described by 2-person games. Typically, it is assumed that such games are symmetric, which implies (i) identical strategy spaces: S 1 = S 2 = S, and (ii) player's receive the same payoffs for identical strategy pairings:
Following Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) and Selten (1980) , a game is asymmetric if players have different strategy sets (tactics), different payoff functions (fighting prowess), or both. 4 In asymmetric games, the standard 2-person game is augmented by a set T = {τ 1 , τ 2 ,…,τ N } of N possible player types/roles where ρ(τ i , τ j ) is the probability that player 1 is assigned the role τ i and player 2 the role τ j . Players have ex ante uncertainty about role assignment, but have perfect information about their own role once the assignment is made. A player in role τ i has strategy space S i and earns payoff Π(s i , s j ) in a pairwise matching with a player in role τ j where s i ∈ S i and s j ∈ S j . When N = 1 and |S 1 | = n, the outcomes of pairwise matchings are represented by an n × n symmetric game. When N > 1 and τ i ≠ τ j , the outcomes of pairwise matchings are represented by
In creating a construct for the evolutionary analysis of asymmetric games, Selten (1980) assumes that the game is truly asymmetric, ρ(τ i , τ i ) = 0 ∀ τ i ∈ T, and role assignment is independent of player designation, ρ(τ i , τ j ) = ρ(τ j , τ i ). Such a game is called an asymmetric contest. If N = 2, then ρ(τ i , τ j ) = .5 and the truly asymmetric game is the symmetrization of the |S i | × |S j | ≡ n × m bimatrix game. As such, the usual static and dynamic concepts of Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, replicator dynamic, and monotone dynamics apply. Consequently, Selten (1980) establishes that an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for the asymmetric contest is a strict Nash equilibrium for the original (asymmetric) game, which occurs in pure strategies only.
In the analysis of intra-state fundamentalism, one's identity in a society is likely to influence whom one associates with. Within-group (assortative) matchings are certainly likely, implying that
is zero, where τ f denotes fundamentalist types and τ o other types.
Further, it is doubtful that the conditional probability that a fundamentalist interacts with an other is the same as the opposite nonassortative mix; i.e., ρ(τ f |τ o ) ≠ ρ(τ o |τ f ). This inequality can be due to sociological considerations or differences in the size of component subpopulations. Together, these observations motivate our consideration of group effects (assortative matching) in the analysis of intra-state conflict.
Assortative matching in asymmetric games
In order to capture group effects in an asymmetric context, we extend the assortative matching scheme, developed by Bergstrom (2002 Bergstrom ( , 2003 for strategy matches, up one level to that of row and column asymmetry. Let (type space) T ≡ {other, fundamentalist} = {τ o , τ f }, where:
x = the proportion of others;
1 -x = proportion of fundamentalists; and p(x) = conditional probability that an other encounters an other.
We are considering a society that is bifurcated into two subpopulations: others and fundamentalists; hence, the sum of their respective population proportions equals one. The conditional probability p(x) may be determined by demographic characteristics. If others are the majority of the population, then it is logical that p(x) > 0.5. However, p(x) can also be determined by sociological characteristics. If others ostracize fundamentalists, p(x) approaches one. Integration causes a decrease in p (x) . For fundamentalists, we define:
q(x) = conditional probability that a fundamentalist encounters an other, which is again determined by demographic and sociological characteristics. Finally, the fraction of encounters where others meet others is x(1 -p(x)), and fundamentalists meet others is (1 - (x) . By definition, the likelihood of an other-fundamentalist match is the same as a fundamentalist-other match, once the size of each subpopulation is accounted for:
If s o is the incumbent strategy for τ o -types and s f is the incumbent strategy for τ f -types, then the expected payoff for any ŝ o ∈ S o is:
The first term is the expected payoff of other demand, ŝ o , in an assortative matching with the incumbent other demand s o . The second term is the expected payoff for a nonassortative matching with fundamentalists characterized by demand s f . Matchings occur with the prevailing incumbent strategies only, s o and s f . Similarly, the payoff for fundamentalist demand ŝ f ∈ S o is:
These payoffs are significantly different from those in Selten's (1980) asymmetric contest.
Specifically, the asymmetric contest only considers the second term in the right hand side of the equality in (3) and (4), corresponding to a (
By contrast, the assortative (own type) matchings in (3) and (4) are given by the payoff 
Strategies are type-contingent, but not matching-contingent (i.e., there are no separate strategies for that of other (ŝ o , ŝ f ) pairs, as determined by our stability criterion, defined below. Moreover, the principle effect of asymmetry is that it serves as a cue by which an encounter can be settled, thereby removing the need to consider mixed strategies, which serve a similar purpose in symmetric games (Maynard Smith and Parker 1976) . We therefore investigate pure strategies only.
Monotone dynamics
Our stability criterion is monotone dynamics: if strategy s o (s f ) earns a higher expected payoff than 
The first term in brackets in (5) 
5 The biologically based replicator dynamic is included within this criterion. In asymmetric games, smooth monotone dynamics are asymptotically stable for the game's symmetrization (Cressman 2003) . By contrast, an appropriate Lyapunov function is difficult to find, even for bimatrix games (Cressman 2003, p. 50) . 6 Note:
When (5) and (6) For example, the northwest cell of Table 1 gives the conditions for M to be the characterizing strategy for τ o -types when s f = F, and the second term is the stability condition for (5) becomes:
Clash of cultures
As this expected value is negative, s o = M could never characterize others when ŝ o = F is an alternative. Hence, ∅ denotes this impossibility in the northwest cell of Table 1 . Intuitively, F does better than M in an assortative matching with M and also better than M in a nonassortative matching with F. By contrast, when s f = F for the fundamentalists and s o = M for others, s f = F can be monotonically stable, because the only possible mutant is ŝ f = I, and by Eq. (6):
which is the second condition given in the northwest cell of Table 1 . All other conditions in Table 1 are similarly derived (in the Appendix), and are summarized by result 1 below.
Result 1:
The only possible stable outcomes when fundamentalists produce a Clash of
Cultures are (M, I) and (F, F).
The two cells in Table 1 where the stability conditions are jointly met are (M, I) and (F, F).
Hence, an outcome exists where fundamentalists get the lion's share of social control, (M, I), and another where fundamentalists and others stand on equal footing, (F, F).
From Table 1 , the conditions for the stability of the (F, F) equilibrium are not binding.
This reflects reality as the majority of social interactions involving fundamentalists and others are harmonious. More stringent are the conditions for an (M, I) equilibrium, where fundamentalists get the majority of social control. These conditions imply:
Proposition 1: The stability of the (M, I) outcome is inversely related to fundamentalist intolerance (d I ) and the insularity of others (p(x)).
In the Appendix, we establish that simultaneously satisfying the s o = M and s f = I conditions, given in the northeast cell of Table 1 , requires:
The stability of the fundamentalist outcome is inversely related to the level of intolerance, d I , because the right-hand side of Eq. (9) increases with d I . While this may initially appear to be counterintuitive, it is based on the observation that fundamentalists profit by preserving their interaction with modest others. In an evolutionary framework, the existence of modest others over time is positively related to what they receive, d M , in pairings with fundamentalists. Hence, fundamentalist demands must be tempered if they are to attain social control; they cannot demand so much that the modest element among others dies out. Second, the stability of (M, I)
is inversely related to p (x) , which is the likelihood that others are matched with themselves.
Ostracizing intolerant fundamentalists from the general population effectively destabilizes the (M, I) outcome, because fundamentalists cannot profit from interactions with moderate others.
Counterfeitable fundamentalism
When fundamentalism is counterfeitable, a group effect is relevant that has not been previously identified. Specifically, anyone displaying the C trait is engaged in the counterfeitable game (Box 3) regardless of whether a matching is assortative or nonassortative. This is because C is a public declaration of adherence to fundamentalist norms (at least for the purposes of social exchange). Counterfeitability creates a binary environment, based on a classification of society into "us" and "them." When an other adopts the C strategy, his/her interaction with M-or Fothers is given by Box 3. Hence, moderate or fair others engage in Box 1 in pairwise matchings with one another. However, any encounter with a C player (other or fundamentalist) is as given in Box 3. Again, assortative fundamentalist and nonassortative matchings are also given by Box 3. Consequently, if an other chooses not to counterfeit and meets an other making this choice, Box 1 characterizes the outcomes for such (τ o , τ o ) matchings; otherwise, Box 3 characterizes all
History is filled with examples of others who are required to treat dissenters of their own social group at a disadvantage because they do not exhibit fundamentalist traits. This is certainly the case for police who break the "code of silence" and object to group norms. In postrevolutionary Iran, individuals not publicly adhering to Islamic practices could face dire consequences. The same was true in Taliban Afghanistan. When fundamentalism is counterfeitable, all counterfeitable encounters -assortative or nonassortative -are viewed from the lens of Box 3. The ability of counterfeitable fundamentalism to assume social control is then characterized by Table 2 (whose conditions are derived in the Appendix).
Result 2: There are four possible monotonic stable outcomes when fundamentalism is counterfeitable: (F, F), (F, C), (C, F), and (C, C).
The introduction of assortative matchings and the group effects that arise from them allow for the asymmetric outcomes (F, C) and (C, F). The conditions given for these equilibria in Table 2 reveal that they can only occur when both groups are insular. Specifically, the conditional probability that an other meets an other, p (x) , must be at least 0.5 and it might have to be higher (if 2d M > 0.5). Additionally, these equilibria require 0.5 > q(x); i.e., less than half the time a fundamentalist is matched with an other. As group effects must dominate to produce these equilibria, they can also be characterized as symmetric equilibria within each respective group -(F, C) implies a (F, F) matching among others and a (C, C) among fundamentalists. The converse holds for (C, F). In this way, the (F, C) and (C, F) outcomes imply fair treatment within assortative matchings and conflict in nonassortative matchings.
Proposition 2: Counterfeitable fundamentalism allows for equilibrium conflict in nonassortative matchings; specifically, the outcomes (F, C) and (C, F).
One of the advantages of using monotone dynamics as the stability criterion is that it is well-known that Nash equilibria are monotone stable, but that non-Nash equilibria may also be stable. Outcomes (F, C) and (C, F) are stable -even though neither is Nash in Box 3 -because they involve fairness within one's own group. The (F, C) outcome is intuitive because it depicts a situation in which others are fair amongst themselves, fundamentalists are counterfeitable, and therefore fair amongst themselves, and the conflictive (F, C) outcome occurs for nonassortative other-fundamentalist matches. From Table 2 , this outcome occurs when each group is so insular that the inefficiency produced by such conflict is sufficiently rare. 
Proposition 3 qualifies Proposition 1, where a fundamentalist society is inversely related to the level of intolerance. Now, the success of (counterfeitable) fundamentalism is a balancing act between the level of intolerance and fundamentalist nonassortativity (the frequency of encounters with others), q (x) . As long as q(x) ∈ (0.5/d I , 1), the left branch from M o in Figure 1 is precluded, as is the left branch from C f because q(x) ∉ (0, 0.5). Modest others will then counterfeit. The result qualifies Arce and Sandler (2003) , where counterfeitable behavior is positively related to intolerance in the presence of moderate others and no group effects. Now, counterfeitability is positively related to the level of fundamentalist nonassortativity, which in turn is inversely related to the level of intolerance. What produces an (F, F) outcome is the preclusion of moderate behavior in general society in favor of dogmatic fairness. The less moderate behavior there is, the smaller is the basin of attraction for counterfeiting among fundamentalists. The dynamics of a dogmatically fair society given in Table 2 This means that the effects of ostracizing fundamentalists given in Proposition 1 no longer hold.
Instead, the more open a society, the lower p (x) , and the more likely is the path from F o to (F, F).
This proposition brings to the forefront what is meant by a fair society.
Proposition 4 is a qualified endorsement of democracy, because democracy is not sufficient for fairness. A tyrannical majority may create the bifurcation that violates Proposition individuals and openness rather than liberal democracy.
Proposition 4 has an interesting real-world implication for modern-day terrorism. In the terrorism literature, there has always been a concern about the proper response in a liberal democracy, where openness is valued (see, e.g., Hoffman 1998 , Wilkinson 1986 . If a liberal democracy appears too weak in its response, it fails its role of protecting lives and property and, consequently, loses legitimacy. If, however, its response is too harsh, the government is viewed as repressive and this may lend legitimacy to the terrorists' alleged grievances. When the terrorists are fundamentalists, the government's and the nonfundamentalists' response must not alter the population dynamics in favor of the fundamentalists if the terrorist campaign is to remain unsuccessful. Proposition 4 indicates that efforts to respect everyone's viewpoints and to maintain openness (i.e., noninsularity) counter counterfeitable fundamentalism and the undesirable dynamics that it engenders. Thus, in the aftermath of September 11, community leaders acted responsibly to remind citizens not to ostracize those who display fundamentalist traits. Our analysis provides a theoretical basis for the desirability of an open and fair society in the face of fundamentalist intolerance and counterfeitable behavior.
Concluding remarks
This paper extends the study of the evolutionary dynamics of fundamentalism to allow for both assortative and nonassortative matchings in bifurcated populations consisting of fundamentalists and others.
In so doing, we analyze group effects for an asymmetric game. In the absence of counterfeitable markers, a fundamentalist takeover of society is curtailed when nonfundamentalists are insular and fundamentalist demands are intolerant. With counterfeitability, nonfundamentalists feign fundamentalist traits to obtain more favorable social terms of trade, and equilibrium conflict may result in predominately nonassortative pairings. To take control, counterfeitable fundamentalists must balance their level of intolerance and their insularity. We also establish that a fair and open society that does not ostracize fundamentalists is more effective at countering fundamentalists' efforts to dominate a society.
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